


Honorary Patron of EUSI – Her Honor, Lois Mitchell, Lieutenant Governor of Alberta




EDMONTON UNITED SERVICES INSTITUTE  
**PRESIDENT'S ENEWS**  
**MARCH 2017**

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**President's Comment**





On behalf of EUSI, I attend the Conference of Defence Association (CDA) conference and AGM on Feb 15, 16 and 17, 2017 in Ottawa. This is a most informative conference that included in the panel the Chief of Defence Staff, Leader of the Opposition Party, numerous former Vice Chiefs of Staff, many prominent academics and many diplomats. The Commander of NORAD, USAF General Lori Robinson also spoke on US and Canada cooperation on the defense of North American air defense. Many who spoke agreed that the bad guys today are Russia, Iran, and North Korea. China is also labeled potential threat to the Pacific states due to its naval expansion. The Chinese Ambassador and his Military Attaché walked out of the conference following a number of such remarks. The Japanese and South Korean Ambassadors took all of these in stride and smiled frequently. A common concern is that threat of cyber attack is real and carries dire consequences. Canadian academics are concerned that our government is not prepared and not doing enough to ward off cyber attacks. A balance will have to be reached between the protection of Canadian security and compromise of privacy. On Tuesday, February 28, 2017, Canadian Security Intelligence Services (CSIS) released its annual report (for 2014 to 2016) which stated that the federal government is facing serious cyber attack on a daily basis. State sponsored and extremist entities continue to target Canada for malicious cyber activities. Such attacks include private sector in the advanced technology sector. Alongside cyber attack, terrorism remains a top security threat for Canada and that cyber attack and terrorism are not mutually exclusive. That means terrorists could take advantage of cyber activities to conduct destructive operations.

Concerned about the recent "suspension" of the Vice Chief of Defence Staff, Admiral Norman, and the involuntary resignation of the Honorary Colonel of 401 Fighter Squadron, Laurie Hawn, I have asked the Acting Vice Chief of Defence Staff, Vice Admiral Lloyd, during the CDA AGM whether the atmosphere in "the Hill" is more "gagging" or less free to speak or address public policies for senior bureaucrats/civil servants. The answer was that one must "remain within the lane" when commenting on sensitive topics. My own conclusion is that the current government will act much quicker to suppress any dissenting remarks or perceived unsuitability to remain on the top job. The recent change of cabinet ministers and re-assignment of senior government positions should give a hint.

## **Commonwealth Day and Reception**



Commonwealth Day is celebrated on the second Monday of March. It is the day when Commonwealth countries, which represent a quarter of all humanity, acknowledge their common bonds and the contribution of the Commonwealth of Nations to the creation of a harmonious global environment. This year, we celebrated the Commonwealth Day with a Reception to be held at the Officer's Mess of the Brigadier James Curry Jefferson Armoury, at 11630 - 109 Street in Edmonton, at 5 PM on 13 March, 2017. The Queen's greetings will be delivered via satellite. An open invitation is extended to all.

The Commonwealth does not have the power as United Nations and certainly do not have the might as NATO to enforce any conditions or sanctions. It is effective in its own way to promote respect for diversity, democracy, religious freedom, and cultural values. Unfortunately, not unlike other institutions, it is getting less known to people, especially among the younger generations. I dare to say, many will not know that Canada is a Commonwealth nation and the head of the Commonwealth is Queen Elizabeth. The Royal Commonwealth Society of Edmonton has a newly completed Video available on YouTube and on its website:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UvrXsRQU0Ng>

## **Royal Commonwealth Society of Canada National Convention**


RCSC will hold its annual national convention in Edmonton on June 2 and 3, 2017 at the Kingsway Ramada Hotel. In addition to a powerhouse guest speakers, a formal dinner is scheduled for Saturday, June 3, 2017. We have booked the Saint City for a night of ball room music and bring back the glamorous dress up event.

## **Welcome Home to Our Troops Returning from Eastern Europe**

About 260 soldiers from CFB Edmonton are scheduled to return home from their overseas deployment, Ops Reassurance and Ops Unifier, between Feb 24 and March 9. The Edmonton Salutes Committee has once again organized to welcome home our troops at the Edmonton International Airport with Timmie's coffee and donuts at hand. The EUSI, a founding member of the Edmonton Salutes Committee, was there also. Our media director, Grant Cree, took photos and video shots and interviewed members of the battle group. To watch the videos, please go to [Grantcree.ca](http://Grantcree.ca), or Facebook, Edmonton United Services Institute or [EUSI.ca](http://EUSI.ca) and click on YouTube., Compliment of Grant Cree. Thank you Kaet Corbould of the City of Edmonton Military Liaison and member of Edmonton Salutes Committee for making our soldiers feel at home always.

## **Alberta & the Great War - Borealis Gallery, Legislature Assembly, the Federal Building, 9820 – 107 Street, Edmonton, February 17 to May 22, 2017**

The Alberta Legislature in partnership with the Provincial Archives will host a series of exhibits and public programs at the Pehonan Theatre. All programs are free. For more information, visit [assembly.ab.ca/visitorcentre/borealis](http://assembly.ab.ca/visitorcentre/borealis).





St. Julien Memorial

They ask me where I've been,  
And what I've done and seen.  
But what can I reply  
Who know it wasn't I,  
But someone just like me,  
Who went across the sea  
And with my head and hands  
Killed men in foreign lands...  
Though I must bear the blame,  
Because he bore my name.

Get trained!



## HUMOUR – submitted by a retired Vandoo LCol, GG. McLean

### What is Celibacy?

Celibacy can be a choice in life, Or a condition imposed by circumstances.


While attending a Marriage Weekend, My wife and I, listened to the instructor declare,  
'It is essential that husbands and wives know the Things that are important to each other.."

He then addressed the men, 'Can you name and describe your wife's favourite flower?'  
I leaned over, touched my wife's hand gently, and whispered, 'Robin Hood All-Purpose, isn't it?'  
And thus began my life of celibacy.....





## CANADIAN MILITARY READING



by Jean-Marie Guehenno

Reviewed by James V. Arbuckle, for *Peacehawks*

Jean-Marie Guehenno was appointed United Nations Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations (USG PKO) in 2000, and held that position until 2008. A “scholar-diplomat”, as one blurbist has characterized him, he was until his appointment without direct experience of the United Nations.

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was created in 1992 from the Department of Special Political Affairs, which had been responsible for PKOs since their inception in 1948. The then USG for that Department, Marrack Goulding, assumed the leadership of the new DPKO until he was succeeded by Kofi Annan in 1993. Annan was replaced by Bernard Miyet of France in 1997 when Annan became Secretary-General. Since then all DPKO USGs have been French, and on 1 April of this year Jean-Pierre Lacroix will replace Herve Ladsus.

The book is engagingly written, and conveys well the feel of the immediacy of high diplomacy, but careful readers may find some things missing.

**Among the Missing**

There are in *my* reading of this book some important things missing. My first stumble came very quickly. It is early 2000, and Guehenno is interviewing for “the job”, and meets with his soon-to-be predecessor, Bernard Miyet. A peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone has pretty well broken down: nearly an entire battalion of Blue Berets (“who had not been prepared for the challenge”) has been taken hostage. Guehenno expresses his concern, Miyet laughs, he has spoken to the press, everything would be fine, “this was just one day in the life of peacekeeping.” “In the event, says Guehenno, “the mission, after a daring operation conducted by Indian troops and with the help of British Special Forces, did recover” That is not the whole story at all, and we have written more fully of that on this site.

In the first place, the captors of almost an entire UN battalion were mostly children – the notorious West Side Boys, and even their putative leadership was scarcely adult.

Second, the Indian Force Commander was locked in a bitter dispute with his staff officers, who were mostly Africans, and whom he accused of corruption, incompetence and disloyalty. Not surprisingly, the Indian Battalion (whose contingent commander he was) was demoralized and morose – they played no role in the resolution of the hostage situation.

It should also be noted that the UN force had an initial strength of 11,000 (a request to the governments of France, Great Britain and the U.S. for additional troops was refused by all three).

*In the event*, the various groups of hostages were freed in two British operations, with never more than 500 British troops; the West Side Boys melted away, never to reappear. The Indian Force Commander left the mission; the Indian battalion was withdrawn. And so, at the end of 2005, the UN was able to announce that

*As the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) comes to a close at the end of this year, it may serve as a model for successful peacekeeping, as well as a prototype for the UN's new emphasis on peacebuilding.*

And it is just this aura of superficiality which haunts this book: a feeling that, for all the high-level diplomacy, there is really no one in charge of almost 100,000 peacekeepers.

Guehenno, by his own account, seems to have spent most of his first two years dealing with Iraq and Afghanistan (pp 1-34), neither of which was remotely to be considered peacekeeping in any form. Iraq was an invasion aimed at regime change; Afghanistan was a continuation of “the war on terror.” In both cases the UN role was marginal, and the real players apparently wanted it to stay that way.

Guehenno “accepted” the creation of a “strategic military cell” in DPKO. In direct line of descent from that cell is today the Office of Military Affairs (OMA), which consists of 100 officers, once again seconded, and 27 civilian staff. It appears from its published terms to be a planning and advisory staff. While it may include a situation centre, that does not appear prominently in the UN’s description of the Office, nor at all in this book. The OMA is headed by the military advisor to DPKO, normally a serving Lieutenant General, but there is in the book no mention of the appointment nor the function, nor is any Military Advisor named. Instead, Guehenno would “repeatedly” call on the retired Canadian General Maurice Baril, who had been the military advisor to Annan when he was USG DPKO. It seems to have been enough.

A brigade of up to 5000 troops would normally have a headquarters with at least 50 officers. Three brigades would usually be organized in a division with a headquarters staff of at least 100 officers. Three divisions would normally be organized in a corps, which might have 100,000 troops – which is just about how many peacekeepers there are in the world today – and such a major formation would have a headquarters staff of at least 500 officers. DPKO in New York has 100 officers.

## **Command and control of UN Forces**

Further on the subject of command and control, it is worth noting that Guehenno has accepted and repeated a false impression of what command and control measures were or should have been in effect.

It is 2003, and a possible peacekeeping mission for Cote d'Ivoire is being discussed; the French "had very bad memories of their experience with UN peacekeeping forces in Yugoslavia; *they did not want their forces to be put under UN command.*" (page 97). One is reminded of Senator Bob Dole, jeering that Boutros Ghali would never send American soldiers anywhere. It is one thing for an American Senator not to understand this issue, but it is quite another when a USG DPKO doesn't either. The UN has borrowed rather freely from NATO command and control doctrine, but usually without really knowing what that doctrine means

National military forces contributed to a UN mission are never under the full command of the UN, nor for that matter, are committed NATO troops fully under the command of NATO either. The command and control of joint and combined military operations, which pkos usually are, are governed by two principles:

1. There are degrees of and limitations on command and control of national forces under foreign command; and
2. There is always a national override on foreign command of national contingents. This is often referred to as "parallel command."

This is not the place for a full discourse on types and degrees of command; suffice it here to say that UN peacekeepers are organized in national contingents, and these contingents are placed under the *operational control* of a theatre commander, which usually means the Force Commander of a peacekeeping operation. These national units will retain their organizational and mission integrity, that is to say, they will be deployed where and for the purpose that was agreed between the troop contributor nation and the United Nations.

And *that* is what Guehenno *should* have replied to the French and "their very bad memories."

It may be said that this is inflexible, that it ties the senior commanders' hands and that it exacerbates the centrifugal forces inherent in an international mission – "parallel command" being just one example of the latter – and that is all true. That is also just how it is, and for the USG responsible for nearly 100,000 troops to be less than crystal clear in his handling of this complex and critical issue is remarkable.

### **Srebrenica – the whole story, or none at all**

Srebrenica, that symbol of peacekeeping disaster, gets a few cursory references: will Bunia, in the Congo, be "another Srebrenica?" Later, it is noted that, on the release of the report of the UN enquiry, five years after the fall of Srebrenica, a Dutch minister who had had nothing to do with his nation's peacekeepers, has resigned, taking "political responsibility for the conduct of Dutch troops in Srebrenica."

What is this all about? Was the conduct of the Dutch troops in Srebrenica so shameful? And this is the very trouble with symbols: they short-circuit real thinking and send the public consciousness directly to a reflexive reaction to the event, the people, to the dangers of a recurrence – all without knowing just what happened.

The real issue here is not the courage or the suitability, still less the structure or the equipment of the few UN troops there at the time. The real issue, and the danger of a recurrence of such a tragedy, is the phenomenon of mission creep, and Guehenno is certainly aware of its dangers: In the case of French and American reluctance to support the operation in Cote d'Ivoire, he notes that "The all-too-typical compromise was easy to reach, at the expense of the UN: more tasks and no resources to perform them." (page 108) If such an important subject is to be brought up at all, it should be presented in a manner that will inform, educate – warn. As Guehenno said of the Congo, "This was not Cyprus."

### **Peace and the Powers: In the Shadows of their Smiles**

A *leitmotif* of this book is mistrust of the major powers: they don't mean what they say, and they don't say what they mean:

For the UN, the most painful lesson ... is actually how little care, political as well as human, key member states showed for the organization they had created ... (page 62)

A rather typical transaction centered on the roles and structures of the peacekeeping force for the Congo, MONUC: the French wanted additional tasks for the Force, while the US would approve no additional resources; the Force got the additional tasks, and of course no additional resources.

The effect of the policy known as the Responsibility to Protect should therefore have come as no surprise.

The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) released its report on The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in December 2001. This ostensibly became U.N. policy when it was embraced by the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, and by nearly all member states of the U.N., in September 2005. However, it is today very clear that the Security Council will seldom, if ever, authorize this type of intervention in a member state – in the intervening twelve years they have done so only once, in the case of Libya in 2001. The issues of consent of the “hosts” and respect for their “domestic jurisdiction” – *the last refuge of scoundrels* – are as strong as ever. Why was this any surprise to anyone? As Guehenno reflects ruefully on the events in the Sudan, “There was a certain amount of carelessness in introducing the rigor of a judicial process into a situation where one of the potential culprits was a government that no state was prepared to challenge seriously.” Why not? And the Sudan was an absolute text-book example of the situation described in R2P – underlined by the indictment in 2010 of the President of Sudan by the ICC for crimes against humanity, including murder, attacks on civilians and genocide, to which the African Union responded heatedly (Bashir has never been arrested).

Later in his book, Guehenno describes the reaction to the Chapter VII (enforcement) mission finally authorized by the Security Council for Darfur and South Sudan as “a very confrontational decision that we had hoped would not be taken. The council had boxed itself into a corner and was now gambling that intimidation would work and that consent could be imposed. But the government of Sudan *never gave its consent*, and its refusal exposed the emptiness of the strategy pursued by the majority of the council.” (page 199) We now need to ask just whose side Guehenno was on here? Does he dispute the right, indeed the duty, of the Security Council to create, to induce, to impose consent? It was Kofi Annan’s specific policy that, where necessary, the UN might do just that.

Is Guehenno perhaps opposed to peace enforcement operations in general? In his description of negotiations in Lebanon, Guehenno relates that Israel and the U.S. insisted on a Chapter VII enforcement operation, an option “categorically” rejected by Hezbollah. Guehenno is skeptical: “Chapter VII”, he says, “is designed for situations where force needs to be used without the consent of the state concerned. ... In the case of Lebanon, Chapter VII would have been warranted if the Security Council was willing to deploy a force in south Lebanon without the consent of Lebanon, or was prepared to maintain its deployment there even if that consent was withdrawn.” (page 222) Just so, but Guehenno concludes, “This was obviously not the case ...”

In the case of the Sudan, Guehenno says that the council “would hide its humiliation by accepting a bad compromise at the expense of the UN: the ‘hybrid mission’”. Just what is meant here by a hybrid mission, and what is so awful about it, Guehenno does not explain. Presumably he anticipated a joint UN-AU mission, which he and many others thought would be for several reasons unworkable. To our knowledge, a hybrid mission is a multi-agency structure, in which civil and military, governmental and non-governmental, local, regional and international agencies cooperate from the outset under a single, formalized organizational umbrella, just as they usually, eventually, grudgingly, informally do. The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) which had a UN headquarters served by elements of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe

(OSCE) and, as an adjunct, a military force led by NATO (KFOR), was an early and ambitious “hybrid mission”, and was on the whole successful. Why such a mission in Africa is a “bad compromise” is not made clear in this book.

It is quite understandable that a USG who would have to deliver on the expectations raised by a Chapter VII deployment might be skeptical, might well doubt that the international community could muster the will, and would provide the means, for sustainable military operations beyond the limits of host nation consent. That is just why R2P has been such a non-starter: it was always just all talk. But why he regards hybrid missions with similar skepticism remains unclear. Is it because what works in Europe owes its relative successes to the strength of European regional organizations; that doesn't work in Africa just because of their absence? If that is so, then this book was certainly the place to say so.

## Conclusions

This is a curious and somewhat conflicted book, as is in fact signaled in the sub-title: *A Memoir of International Peacekeeping in the 21st Century*. I can only infer from this *memoir* that Guehenno was little interested in the command and control of almost 100,000 peacekeepers around the globe, and that he had little interest in a military staff or in military advice. He does not seem to believe in non-consensual operations because he does not trust the UN to muster the will nor to deliver the means for such operations. This may be an accurate judgment – mission creep is real and more common than it should be, but that is solving a problem by elimination, which is not solving the problem at all. He does not believe that consent can be induced, let alone coerced, despite the then-Secretary General having publicly stated that both were active peacekeeping options. It seems then that Guehenno has little confidence in operations mandated in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN. And whatever and however he understands hybrid operations, he doesn't like them either.

Perhaps I draw inferences the author never intended to imply. Perhaps – but one would not normally omit to discuss matters of grave concern, especially those issues of command and control of peacekeeping operations, which are clearly of great concern to the troop contributors. And I need not be reminded that there is much more to peacekeeping than military – my own book is nearly entirely about civil-military affairs, inter-operability and cooperation. But, like it or not, military peacekeepers are usually what the big bucks are for and, just as usually, a successful peace operation is the *conditio sine qua non* of all the other softer power components of a multi-agency operation. Perhaps I ask too much of this “memoir”, but this is not peacekeeping for beginners, and serious readers need to know more about just how these operations are conducted. And so do the troop contributors.

It is all very well for diplomats to be parachuted into senior management positions – it was ever thus – but parachutists need the backup of professional, experienced and more or less permanent staff. I know perfectly well that DPKO is not and is not trying to be a defence ministry, but its interactions with troop contributors are largely through defence ministries and general staffs, and a bit more professionalism on their part would certainly not be amiss. The requirement is for a civil service, and/or a general staff, as appropriate to the agency or the department. Guehenno was more than a little like a defense minister without a general staff.

I conclude that, whatever the many professional virtues Guehenno will certainly have possessed, he had this job principally because the position had been earmarked, and remains so to this day, as French. Thus the biggest job in the UN below the Secretary General went to and has continued to be filled by a French nominee with neither UN nor military experience. It is all very well to nominate diplomats for high UN positions, but I believe that a good deal more is required for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

**Editor's Note – this is a critical analysis of the UN organization and reason why so many commented on the need for an overhaul of this organization.**



## CANADIAN GEAR

### C2 105-MM HOWITZER




Canadian Uniforms

This howitzer is a mobile, general purpose, towed field artillery weapon. The C2 is manually operated, single loaded, air cooled, and uses semi-fixed ammunition. It can be employed for direct or indirect fire and, in the latter case, is very effective against most types of ground targets. The C2 is towed by a truck that carries both the crew and ammunition.

## What's Out There?

### RPG-32 (Russia)

The RPG-32 is a modular weapon that inherited proven and successful solutions in design of the weapon and rockets from earlier Russian grenade launchers, and it can be used to successfully engage and destroy a wide variety of battlefield targets, from modern main battle tanks and armored personnel carriers to bunkers, military equipment and troops in defilade or in the open. This versatility is achieved by using as much as four types of ammunition in one weapon - two types of 105mm rockets and two types of smaller and lighter 72mm rockets. In each caliber, there's a HEAT rocket (with tandem warhead in 105mm caliber, optimized against ERA-equipped tanks) and a FAE / thermobaric rocket with enhanced fragmentation effect, optimized against lightly armored and soft targets.



Securitas

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**IT IS TOO LATE TO SHARPEN SWORDS, WHEN THE DRUMS OF WAR ARE BEATING**